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Abstract
Previous studies of the effects of transitional justice measures on
post-conflict societies, specifically the longevity of emerging peace,
have reached different conclusions, owing in part to whether they
are large-n or small-n studies. We propose an alternative
methodological approach, Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA), to address the controversy. QCA allows researchers to
harness the qualitative depth of case studies, yet also facilitates
broad cross-national comparison. Using the Post-Conflict Justice
dataset, we show how QCA reveals several pathways societies can
take to enduring peace. These depend on characteristics of the
preceding conflict, differences in the post-conflict conditions, and
the transitional justice measures implemented. This complexityorientated approach shows that restorative and retributive justice
measures, as well as amnesties, can have positive effects on postconflict peace, although these effects are different depending on
the conflict situations and the varying context conditions.

The authors would like to thank the anoymous reviewer and the editors of this
issue for their comments, which greatly benefited the piece; furthermore, thanks
goes to Susanne Buckley-Zistel for discussions of the initial idea of this piece.
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Introduction
What effects do transitional justice measures actually have? Do
truth commissions or trials contribute to better respect of human
rights after repressive regimes? Do trials foster peace or do they
fuel conflicts, making it better to refrain from trying perpetrators
and granting amnesties? Or is it perhaps necessary to combine
certain measures to achieve stable peace, democracy and human
rights after conflicts or repressive regimes? These are some of the
pressing questions data-based transitional justice research tries to
answer. There has been a wealth of research on these topics in the
two decades since Neil Kritz’s2 three-volume overview. Moreover,
in recent years several research endeavors have brought forth large
datasets, which allow transitional justice measures to be analyzed
across a large number of cases.
In their 2010 article, Oskar Thoms, James Ron, and Roland
Paris provide a comprehensive overview of studies of transitional
justice’s effect at the state level. The authors note that there are
“competing claims about the causal effects of various transitional
justice mechanisms,”3 which so far had been insufficiently
supported by sound empirical evidence. The authors review
empirical literature on the effects of trials, truth commissions, and
multiple transitional justice instruments at the state level of analysis
(as opposed to the individual/community level or global norm
development) and differentiate between small-, medium- and
large-n studies. Their critique identifies several problems in
research design. For example, transitional justice studies rely on a
biased knowledge base, drawing conclusions mainly from wellstudied cases, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Moreover, authors have a tendency to draw
comparisons across a single region, which may influence the

Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former
Regimes (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
3 Oskar N.T. Thomas, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of
Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?” International Journal of Transitional
Justice 4.3 (2010): 329–354, 330.
2
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transferability of results to other countries4. Single case studies, in
their view, offer little from which to draw general conclusions,
have problems of establishing causality, and rely on evidence that
is mainly anecdotal. Small- and medium-n qualitative studies lack
statistical sophistication, do not sufficiently control for other
factors and, hence, it is difficult to draw causal conclusions from
them5. In general, at the time of their study, not many large-n
studies on the state level effects of transitional justice had been
conducted. However, the authors point out the value of new,
comprehensive datasets for the research field. They further call for
more mixed-method research combining sophisticated statistical
analyses with high-level case studies to do justice to case
specificities on the one hand, but produce comparable results on
the other hand6. While we distance ourselves from claiming that
previous transitional justice research is based primarily on faith, we
do join them in this call for combining methods to increase causal
leverage. To do so, we propose a more nuanced matching, which
is better suited to the various understandings of how the world
works inherent in the two methods in question.
Furthermore, given the complexity of post-conflict
societies, it is surprising how reductionist the effects of transitional
justice are sometimes gauged to be. In general, studies about the
impact of transitional justice that go beyond the examination of
specific cases tend to concentrate on certain individual transitional
justice measures, specific effects of transitional justice, or both.
Hence, it seems important to further look at a combination and
sequencing of transitional justice measures, as well as different
contexts in which these measures are introduced.
In pursuit of this research aim and in search of systematic,
yet context-sensitive assessments, we provide a short overview of
studies dealing with the impact of transitional justice measures,
focusing mainly (but not only) on the question of their impact on
peace. We subsequently propose an alternative methodological
approach, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which enables
researchers to identify causal patterns across a larger number of
Ibid., 336.
Ibid., 338.
6 Ibid., 342.
4
5
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cases without losing as much of the qualitative richness of case
studies. We then utilize the Post-Conflict Justice (PCJ) dataset to
illustrate how QCA presents multiple pathways towards enduring
peace, depending on characteristics of the preceding conflicts,
differences in the post-conflict conditions, and the chosen
transitional justice measures. We conclude by underlining the
importance of reflecting upon and integrating complexity into our
analyses of post-conflict transitional justice measures.
Different Methodologies, Different Results: Effects of Truth
Commissions, Trials, and Amnesties
This article begins by synthesizing the growing body of research
that examines the effects of trials, truth commissions, and
amnesties, mainly concentrating on the question of transitional
justice’s contribution to peace. We also look at studies that deal
with questions of combining or sequencing transitional justice
measures and the context in which justice phenomena are found.
Because various studies are based on different empirical bases, they
are not always directly comparable. However, given our focus on
cross-case comparison of transitional justice measures’ impact, it is
a worthwhile endeavor to relate the results of these studies to each
other nonetheless. In this, there is a tendency that studies using
different methodologies come to different conclusions regarding
transitional justice measures’ effects. In general, this tendency
suggests that small-n, qualitative studies assume negative effects of
trials, but positive effects of truth commissions or amnesties. By
contrast, large-n research generally finds positive effects of trials
and negative effects of amnesties and truth commissions alone. We
posit that while both of these approaches have their advantages, a
different approach could allow us to tease out some of the
intricacies of the complex relationships among various measures
and the context within which they are being employed. Hence, it
seems to be worthwhile to further interrogate the effects of
transitional justice measures to try to find a ‘middle-ground’:
systematic research that allows us to compare across a larger
number of cases but also to capture complexity and contextsensitivity. This research avenue should thus allow us to assess the
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 96-123
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relation of transitional justice measures and “complex social
processes”7, such as (societal) peace or conflict.
Truth Commissions
Initially, the comparative literature on truth commissions was
dominated by case studies that were more concerned with “taking
stock”, examining mandates, designs and circumstances of
establishment, than with looking at truth commissions’ impact on
societies.8 When authors did study impact, truth commissions’
“success” was often measured by whether a truth commission
fulfilled its mandate or not, and not by its impact on the transitional
society.9 In the initial absence of a systematic assessment of
impact, there was a tendency to assume positive effects of truth
commissions.10 On the other hand, Elin Skaar and Camila Gianella
Malca11 mention Jelena Subotić’s12 claim that truth commissions
can potentially threaten peace because they could “exacerbate
Elin Skaar and Camila Gianella Malca, “Transitional Justice Alternatives.
Claims and Counterclaims,” in After Violence: Transitional Justice, Peace, and
Democracy, ed. Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella Malca, and Trine Eide (Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2015), 1.
8 See, for example, Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994:
A Comparative Study,” Human Rights Quarterly 16.4 (1994): 597-655; Priscilla
Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the challenge of truth commissions (New York:
Routledge, 2002).
9 Eric Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success
and Impact,” International Studies Perspectives 8.1 (2007): 16-35, 17-19. One
example for a quantitative study dealing with truth commissions’ contribution
toward democratization would be Laura Taylor and Alexander Dukalskis, “Old
Truths and New Politics Does Truth Commission ‘Publicness’ impact
Democratization?” Journal of Peace Research 49.5 (2012): 671-684. They, however,
concentrate on one specific feature of the justice measure, “the publicness” of
truth commissions, which they hold to have positive effects on democratization.
10 For overviews, see, David Mendeloff, “Truth‐Seeking, Truth‐Telling, and
Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?” International Studies Review 6.3
(2004): 355-380; Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, Andrew G. Reiter, and Eric
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “When Truth Commissions Improve Human Rights,:
International Journal of Transitional Justice 4. (2010): 457-476, 458 or Skaar and
Malca, “Transitional Justice Alternatives.”
11 Skaar and Malca, “Transitional Justice Alternatives,” 1.
12 Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice. Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 2009).
7
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social divisions”13 and David Mendeloff’s14 assumption that truth
commissions’ impacts on peace may be negligible. Another
example of looking at truth commissions’ effects through a more
critical lens would be Susanne Buckley-Zistel,15 focusing on
narratives that are built through a commission’s work and which
consequences these could entail. Looking at those studies that are
concerned with truth commissions’ impact, mainly on human
rights and democracy in transitional societies, one can observe the
aforementioned tendency of case studies to find more positive
effects of truth commissions than statistical studies,16 at least when
the truth commissions are the only transitional justice measure
implemented.17 This conclusion may change when truth
commissions are combined with other transitional justice
measures18 or depending on the context in which the measures are
deployed.19
One explanation for these differing results is selection bias
in studying truth commissions, since the prominence of cases leads
them to be more carefully and extensively studied. Hence, “it may
be that these cases are truly the best that commission supporters
have to put forward in terms of examples that have influenced the
Skaar and Malca, “Transitional Justice Alternatives,” 10.
Mendeloff, “Truth‐Seeking, Truth‐Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,”
355-380.
15 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Narrative Truths: On the Construction of the Past
in Truth Commissions,” in Transitional Justice Theories, ed. Susanne BuckleyZistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun, and Friederike Mieth (Milton
Park, Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014).
16 See, for example, Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional
Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2010).
17 Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink find positive effects of truth commissions
on human rights, when controlling for material punishment in an assessment of
trials. Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of
Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” International Studies
Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939–963.
18 Olsen et al., “When Truth Commissions Improve Human Rights.”
19 Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø, and Scott Gates, “Post-Conflict
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191,
(2007).
13
14
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course of human rights practices.”20 Generally, notwithstanding the
assumed positive impact of truth commissions and the potential selection bias,
we can observe a tendency in the literature that qualitative studies find more
positive effects of truth commissions than quantitative studies.
Trials and Amnesties
One area of discussion in transitional justice is the so-called peace
versus justice debate, i.e. whether transitional justice measures are
conducive or obstructive to (societal) peace.21 In this section, we
show that there are differing results depending on whether
qualitative or quantitative methods are used, with case studies or
non-statistical studies often finding a negative impact of trials and
a positive impact of amnesties on transitional societies, while
statistical studies come to the opposite conclusion.
Prominent examples for non-statistical studies concluding
positive effects of amnesties and negative effects of trials would be
the assessments of Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri,22 who
qualitatively compare thirty-two cases of civil wars that ended
between 1989 and 2003, and Mahmood Mamdani23 who draws this
conclusion from his study of the International Criminal Court’s
intervention in Darfur.
However, statistical studies mostly point in a different
direction. Trials are often found to have a positive impact on
peace24 and human rights situations in transitional societies.25
Others at least conclude there is no negative impact26 or no effect

Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, 141.
For an overview of positive and negative claims of trials’ and amnesties’
impact on peace, see Skaar and Malca, “Transitional Justice Alternatives,” 8, 14.
22 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28.3
(2003/4): 5-44.
23Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror
(New York: Doubleday Religion, 2009).
24 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace.”
25 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights
Prosecutions.”
26 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing
World Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).
20
21
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at all.27 Findings concerning amnesties’ effects on peace are mixed.
Erik Melander28 finds that amnesty provisions in peace agreements
reduce the risk of relapse into war significantly in authoritarian
states, but he does not find the same for democracies or states in
flux. Tove Grete Lie et al.,29 on the other hand, find destabilizing
effects of amnesties, albeit with weak statistical results. Pointing to
sensitivity of the data to the termination of conflict or the regime
type in which measures are introduced, they consequently suggest
further research to explore the context conditions, character and
intention30 of justice instruments.31
While the abovementioned studies are hardly directly
comparable regarding scope and research design, it still becomes
clear that studies using different methodologies come to different
conclusions on the effects of trials and amnesties on transitional
societies. The tendency here is the opposite to truth commissions: while
statistical studies find more positive effects of trials, qualitative studies are more
skeptical and assume a better record for amnesties.

James D. Meernik, Angela Nichols, and Kimi L. King, “The Impact of
International Tribunals and Domestic Trials on Peace and Human Rights After
Civil War,” International Studies Perspectives 11.4 (2010): 309-334, 327.
28 Erik Melander, “Justice or Peace? A Statistical Study of the Relationship
between Amnesties and Durable Peace,” Lund University, JAD-PbP Working Paper
Series 4, (2009).
29 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace.”
30 Regarding context conditions, Brian Grodsky suggests in a qualitative study
comparing Poland, Croatia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan that transitional justice
measures can only gain traction when the new regime is able to provide essential
goods and services to its constituencies. See, Brian Grodsky, The Costs of Justice:
How New Leaders Respond to Previous Human Rights Abuses (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 2010). For important contributions dealing with the
question of intention in the deployment of or compliance with transitional
justice measures, see Subotić, Hijacked Justice, and Cyanne Loyle and Christian
Davenport, “Transitional Injustice: Subverting Justice in Transition and PostConflict Societies,” Journal of Human Rights, (2015), who suggest that justice
measures may not always be implemented with ‘good’ goals in mind.
31 Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace,” 17.
27
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An Eclectic Mix of Empirical Results: Combination,
Sequencing, Context as Factors to Be Considered
Beyond these studies of individual transitional justice measures,
there are also a number of works that deal with additional
complexity with regard to the combination of transitional justice
measures, namely the sequencing and context in which they occur.
We concur with Chandra Lekha Sriram32 in acknowledging that the
peace versus justice dilemma is oversimplified. Hence, we argue
that it is not a simple question of whether introducing either trials,
truth commissions, or amnesties respectively is more or less likely
to lead to favorable outcomes. In line with Kathryn Sikkink’s call
for a “more nuanced debate,”33 it would instead be necessary to
look at combinations of different transitional justice phenomena,
the timing and order of their establishment, and the contexts in
which they are implemented.
One example of a systematic effort to address this
complexity would be the work of Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and
Andrew Reiter,34 who statistically study the effect of transitional
justice measures on human rights and democracy. Unlike other
studies outlined above, they put an emphasis on the combination
and sequencing of measures. While they do see a positive effect of
transitional justice measures on human rights and democracy in
general, single measures on their own do not have a positive effect.
They find that a “justice balance,”35 a combination of either trials
and amnesties, or of trials, truth commissions, and amnesties after
a transition works best towards improving democracy and the
respect for human rights.36 Nonetheless, other patterns of success
may emerge over time.37
Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and
Peacebuilding,” in Chandra Lekha Sriram, and Suren Pillay (eds.), Peace versus
Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, (Durban: University of
KwaZulu-Natal Press, and Oxford: James Currey, 2010), 5.
33 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 228.
34 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in
Balance (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010).
35 Ibid., 153.
36 Ibid., 6f.
37 Ibid., 161.
32
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More recently, Helga Malmin Binningsbø et al.38
introduced a new dataset on “Armed conflict and post-conflict
justice, 1946–2006.” The novelty the authors provide in their
dataset is linking post-conflict justice measures introduced in the
five-year period after conflict termination directly to a certain
conflict, hence, facilitating the exploration of transitional justice
measures’ effects on transitions to peace.39 Their findings
concentrate on analyzing which post-conflict justice measures are
more likely to occur in which contexts. They suggest that (1)
“[c]onflicts over government control are more likely to lead to PCJ
[post-conflict justice] than territorial conflicts”, (2) low intensity
conflicts are more likely to lead to trials than civil wars, while civil
wars are more likely to lead to amnesties, and (3) trials are more
likely to take place in a setting of decisive victory, which also
facilitates purges and exiles, while amnesties are more common
after bargained solutions of conflict.40
Cyanne Loyle and Benjamin Appel,41 then, use the
abovementioned dataset to explore the question of justice
measures’ contribution to peace. They integrate the post-conflict
justice literature with the conflict-recurrence literature and, in line
with the latter, they find post-conflict justice measures that address
grievances (truth commissions, reparations, amnesties targeted at
the losing side) to be more likely to contribute to stable peace than
opportunity-based phenomena (trials, purges, and exiles
implemented by the party in power), for which there are no
significant results.42
Generally speaking, one can observe several developments
to further efforts of systematization, while at the same time
acknowledging context conditions in transitional justice research.
Helga Malmin Binningsbø, Cyanne E. Loyle, Scott Gates, and Jon Elster,
“Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Justice, 1946–2006: A Dataset," Journal of
Peace Research 49.5 (2012): 731–740.
39 Ibid., 732f.
40 Ibid., 737f.
41 Cyanne Loyle and Benjamin Appel, “Justice and/or Peace: Post-Conflict
Justice and Conflict Reoccurence,” American Political Science Association
Convention. (Seattle, 2011).
42 Ibid., 18f, 24.
38
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One approach is integrating quantitative and qualitative research in
mixed or multi-method approaches. This, for example, is the
approach of Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm43 in his study of truth
commissions’ impact on human rights and democratization or
Geoff Dancy and Veronica Michel,44 who study the role of private
actors in generating “prosecutorial momentum”45 and hence,
strengthening human rights and accountability norms. Another
approach is a “structured comparison of a small number of cases”
as Skaar et al.46 propose as an intermediate approach “to avoid the
shortcomings of single-case studies and statistical analysis”47 in
their assessment of transitional justice measures’ impact on peace
and democracy. A third avenue of research, which is promising to
fulfil the requirement of being both systematic as well as contextsensitive, is qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).
Tricia Olsen and Geoff Dancy acknowledge the value of
employing QCA for transitional justice research because “it helps
us understand how combinations of conditions shape outcomes
and whether multiple pathways to similar outcomes exist.”48 And
most recently, Geoff Dancy and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm49 further
scrutinized the question of timing and sequencing in transitional
justice in relation to democratic consolidation in Latin America,
using QCA. They find “[…] that neither the timing nor the
sequencing of transitional justice policy seems to alter drastically

Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
Geoff Dancy and Veronica Michel, “Human Rights Enforcement From
Below: Private Actors and Prosecutorial Momentum in Latin America And
Europe,” International Studies Quarterly, (2015); doi: 10.1111/isqu.12209.
45 Ibid., 1.
46 Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella Malca, and Trine Eide, “Towards a Framework
for Impact Assessment,” in Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella Malca, and Trine Eide
(eds.), After Violence: Transitional Justice, Peace, and Democracy (Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2015), 29.
47 Ibid.
48 Tricia Olsen and Geoff Dancy, “New Approaches to Studying Transitional
Justice: QCA and the Identification of Multiple Transitional Pathways,” The
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (Honolulu, 2012), 1.
49 Geoff Dancy and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “Timing, Sequencing, and
Transitional Justice Impact: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Latin
America,” Human Rights Review (2015).
43
44
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the potential for democratic consolidation in transitional states.”50
However, they identify “prosecutions of state agents,”51
notwithstanding their timing, as a necessary condition for
democracy. We believe that this is a very promising avenue for
future research. Their research, however, concentrates solely on
Latin America and is not directly comparable with many of the
other large-n studies. We therefore propose to make use of QCA
for a comparison across regions, tackling further questions of
transitional justice measures’ effects on transitional societies.
How Differing Epistemologies Create Differing Results in a
Complex World
As our cursory examination of the transitional justice literature has
demonstrated, different results emerge from research on
transitional justice phenomena based on small-n qualitative case
studies compared with large-n statistical studies. Two reasons why
this could be are the complexity of the world and varying
epistemologies underlying the methods.
First and quite fundamentally, the world is complex and
there may not be one ‘true’ answer that fits all – hence the
dynamics behind enduring peace resulting from transitional justice
could be very different in South Africa than in Guatemala or
Cambodia. As comparative scholars, however, we do not point this
out to essentialize and exoticize each of the cases individually, but
to point out that, while there may be patterns that we can distill
from reality, these are by no means going to apply to all cases
equally. It is quite possible that there are several patterns that may
come to the fore in different contexts and that it is these varying
patterns that we can analyze. Also, complexity means that there
will be outliers, which are singularly different from other cases and
do not fit into the patterns seen as common among several other
cases.
Case studies on their own cannot pick up on this nature of
outliers exogenously, as each case is seen as separate and unique;
nor can case studies point to general patterns. On the other hand,
50
51

Ibid., 3.
Ibid.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 96-123
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statistical analyses can point to outliers, and can to a certain degree
pick up on broad patterns. However, they have difficulty coping
with the same degree of causal complexity with which case studies
can operate, discounting that various cases can have fundamentally
different pathways to the same results.
Second, case studies are based on different epistemological
assumptions than are statistical studies. On the one hand, case
studies or small-n case comparisons are underpinned by the idea
that a researcher can show how transitional justice causes a certain
outcome. The postulated relationships are nearly always
deterministic with the assertion being put forward that cause and
effect have a direct relationship, and this relationship is described
using the language of sufficiency and necessity.52 Large-n, statistical
studies, on the other hand, are based on probabilistic assumptions,
which postulate that certain variables raise the likelihood of a
phenomenon occurring. Here, for the most part, variables are
assigned independent scores on how they increase (or decrease)
the likelihood of the outcome occurring across the entire dataset,
assuming that all else is equal with regard to the other variables.53
Altogether, from a methodological perspective, perhaps it
should not surprise us that different results emerge from the case
study literature than from statistical analyses. Broadly speaking,
statistical analyses are best at showing generalizable connections
between variables across a large number of cases and thus help us
understand causal patterns. Case studies, on the other hand, are wellsuited using process tracing to answer the question of why in a
certain case a certain outcome has occurred and thus illuminating
the causal mechanism which ties cause and effect together.
The Alternative: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
An alternative approach to analyzing transitional justice, which
takes into account these two explanations for why statistical studies
have produced different results to case studies, is to employ the
Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods. Foundations
and Guidelines (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 158; James
Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” Comparative Political Studies
41.4-5 (2008): 412-436, 412, 414.
53 Ibid.
52
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set-theoretic method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).
This method explicitly models causal complexity by allowing
multiple pathways to the outcome to co-exist, each one consisting
of a combination of several conditions. This openness to various
pathways also allows it to be much more sensitive to the context
of each case. At the same time, it has a deterministic epistemology
that allows it to be easily combined with case studies in multimethod research. This section first introduces set-theoretic
approaches in general and QCA specifically, and compares them
both epistemologically to statistical analyses and case-studies as
well as regarding how they are implemented. Then, it highlights
how transitional justice research could be forwarded significantly
through the original combination of QCA and case studies. The
next section then applies this new technique.
The set theoretic approach and its methodological
manifestation in the form of QCA differentiate themselves
strongly in their epistemology from the statistical approach and,
thus, have the potential to be significantly more compatible with
case study approaches. The key difference between statistical
techniques and QCA is that the latter does not look for
probabilistic variations in the data it is analyzing. Instead, QCA
searches for necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence
of the outcome. In set theoretic approaches, concepts are not
assigned values as they are in statistical or case study research.
Rather, for each of the theoretically relevant concepts, a set is
defined as to what ‘full membership’ and ‘no membership’ in the
set would look like. For example, rather than assigning a value to
the degree of amnesties granted by a government, set theoretic
approaches would ask ‘is this case part of the set of cases of
amnesties or not?’ It is also possible to answer this question by
saying that a case is not fully a member of the set, but nonetheless
more out than in, or more in than out, and thus infinitesimal
differentiations become possible. In this context, the ‘threshold’
which demarcates the point where a case becomes more in than
out is decisive, a decision the researcher makes, and the qualitative
difference between cases on either side of this divide is pivotal to
the implementation of the method. For instance, while rigorous
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 96-123
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prosecutions of all former members of a regime would constitute
absolute non-membership in the set amnesty, whereas a general
amnesty of all signifies full membership in the set. However, it
remains a qualitative decision on the part of the researcher on
many of the more ambivalent cases in between. Is an amnesty for
only a few, peripheral figures more in the set of amnesties or is it
not really a member? Is a case in which there is no legal amnesty
law passed, but in which it is clear that the judiciary has been
precluded from or has no inclination to prosecute, a de facto
amnesty or is it not? These are decisions that a researcher makes,
knowing both the case and the concepts. Thus, QCA forces him
or her to think about the concepts and their fit with the cases.
Popularized in the social sciences by Charles Ragin,54 QCA
categorizes cases by combinations of conditions55 leading to the
occurrence or non-occurrence of the outcome, reducing these
combinations to the lowest common denominator using Boolean
algebra.56 By executing this reduction, one can show which
54 Charles Ragin,

The Comparative Method (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1987); Charles Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
55 What are called variables in statistical analysis are conditions in QCA. In its
most basic form, QCA dichotomizes all its explanatory conditions and the
outcome, this sub-type being called crisp set QCA (csQCA). A prominent
further development of the method is fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) which enables
researchers to code their cases along a more continuous categorization, applying
the nuances described above, with ‘fully out’ and ‘fully in’ the set and the
threshold being the most important qualitative markers.
56 In essence, the researcher (or today mostly software employed to do this task)
searches for combinations of conditions which are identical with respect to all
conditions but one and exhibit the same outcome. The logic then is that if the
same outcome occurs regardless of just this one condition’s different
manifestation, then this condition must be irrelevant for causing the outcome
here. Combinations continue to be paired and compared in this manner and
thus reduced to the lowest common denominator. In this process, various
pathways can then emerge as the lowest common denominator of certain
clusters of cases, accounting for causal complexity. During the reduction
process, the qualitative judgement of the researcher is again needed, as
assumptions are made about combinations of conditions which are not
empirically actually present; also, often there are different ways in which the
reduction can proceed and here the researcher’s theoretical knowledge is
required.
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conditions are necessary and which are sufficient for causing the
outcome. The outcome can be caused not by the same condition
in all cases, but by different combinations of multiple factors, each
coming to the fore in different cases. Although it relies on the
strong qualitative judgement of the researcher when categorizing
the cases, its use of a mathematical technique to categorize and
reduce complexity allows for multiple pathways to an outcome,
each consisting of different combinations of conditions. This
conjunctural logic in combination with the set-theoretic principles
that underlie QCA allow for conditions to act differently in
different cases depending on their interaction with other factors.57
Altogether, this also overcomes a further problem, discussed
above, of causal complexity, as it allows for there to be multiple
different pathways to the same outcome. Thus, the approach is
deterministic in its reasoning, focusing on how various
combinations of conditions cause or do not cause an outcome, but
at the same time is quite differentiated, allowing for various ‘routes’
of sufficiency to cause the outcome.
Originally, QCA was conceived as a method for mediumn studies which were too large to study with ordinary case
comparative methods, but not large enough for statistical analysis.
However, in recent years, this limitation to medium-n studies has
been challenged and increasingly QCA is being used in the analysis
of larger datasets.58 Whereas previously the number of analyzed
cases was somewhere roughly between 5 and 30, today studies
often include several hundred cases. This augmentation of its
methodological reach allows for more generalizable arguments to
be formulated out of its results.
For a broader introduction, see Bernard Grofman and Carsten Q. Schneider,
“An Introduction to Crisp Set QCA, with a Comparison to Binary Logistic
Regression,” Political Research Quarterly 62.4 (2009): 662-672; Ragin, The
Comparative Method; Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry; Carsten Q. Schneider and
Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences. A Guide to
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
58 Corinne Bara, “Incentives and Opportunities: A Complexity-Oriented
Explanation of Violent Ethnic Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 51:6 (2014):
696-710.
57
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Furthermore, for large datasets QCA has become an actual
alternative to statistical analysis as it is based on other
epistemological assumptions. QCA sees the threshold with its
qualitative divide as extremely important for analysis and thus it
comes to resemble the nominal differentiation that underlies much
of case study analysis, as described above. The Boolean algebraic
reduction of the data occurs along rules similar to those of the logic
of John Stuart Mill and in this process draws heavily on the
language of necessity and sufficiency, epistemologically close to
case studies, as discussed earlier. The conjunctural logic of QCA
allows for the integration of causal complexity into its results,
providing multiple configurations of conditions and thus
complementing the integral complexity entailed in case study
research well. Bringing together the basis of the same
epistemological assumptions between QCA and case study
research and QCA’s ability to handle large numbers of cases and
thus show complex causal patterns, QCA provides the possibility
to conduct a large-n analysis that is better comparable to the case
study research already conducted.
QCA of Post-Conflict Justice’s Peace Dividend
To highlight our argument, this section turns to the example of the
Post-Conflict Justice Dataset59 and demonstrates the set-theoretic
interrogation of the data. This large-n QCA analysis results in
several combinations of conditions that are each sufficient for
ensuring a post-conflict peace dividend, demonstrating causal
patterns that can subsequently be matched to the extant and
emerging literature to uncover the causal mechanisms behind these
combinations. As Binningsbø et al.60 point out, their dataset is
particularly suitable to explore transitions to peace. As we have
shown in our review, there are no clear-cut, common results in the
literature. Hence, it is worthwhile to do further research on the
question of whether transitional justice measures can foster peace.
In this section, we discuss the results of a first set-theoretic
interrogation of large-n data provided by the PCJ dataset.
59
60

Binningsbø et al., “Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Justice.”
Ibid.
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To test the impact of various transitional justice measures
on post-conflict sustainable peace, we make use of the PCJ dataset,
while bringing in additional conditions of interest from other
datasets. Our unit of analysis is post-conflict peace periods, defined
by the dataset as the five-year period after an armed conflict ends.
This post-conflict time frame of five years may not be ideal as one
could argue that transitional justice processes which occur six,
seven or ten years after the end of conflict are also theoretically
interesting for ensuring long-lasting peace. However, Binningsbø
et al.61 argue that this five-year time frame is conventional in the
literature and that it ensures that any post-conflict transitional
justice process “truly occurs in the aftermath of war and therefore
has the potential to influence the likelihood of conflict
reoccurrence.”
The dataset includes all armed conflicts from 1946 until
2006 as defined by UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset,
meaning that the dataset runs until 2011 given the five-year postconflict peace period. All ongoing conflicts as of 2006 are excluded
from the analysis as the conflict is not terminated and thus there is
no possibility to study the occurrence and non-occurrence of postconflict transitional justice measures in them. Furthermore we are
here only interested in civil wars and their post-conflict
developments, so we include all internal and internationalized
internal armed conflicts, but do not look at international or
extrasystemic (predominantly decolonization) wars as it is expected
that these will exhibit qualitatively different characteristics.
Altogether, our adapted dataset includes 300 post-conflict peace
periods.
The outcome of interest for us is whether in a post-conflict
setting enduring peace can be manufactured by using or refraining
from post-conflict transitional justice processes; we label this
‘successful’ outcome of no more armed conflict in the postconflict period as a ‘peace dividend’. We dichotomize the outcome
condition of the occurrence of peace (peace dividend), thus
differentiating between cases that at some stage regress into
61

Ibid., 733.
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conflict again (0) and those that remain peaceful until the end of
the dataset (1). It is important to note that some countries have
multiple conflicts occurring within their borders and we
differentiate here not at a national level but at the conflict level.
Only if the conflict, in which Side A or Side B is involved, returns
is this classed as 0;62 if it does not return between these two sides
then it is deemed to have returned a peace dividend and is coded
1. This results in 204 cases of enduring peace emerging from a
post-conflict setting, around two thirds of the cases.
An obvious shortfall of this approach is that it is biased in
favor of more recent cases; more recently terminated conflicts have
a temporal advantage in the sense that they have had less time to
regress into conflict. However, this temporal bias regarding
repeating violence (or more generally the re-occurrence of any
phenomenon) is omnipresent in all analyses, and also it is not
unrealistic to assume that after a certain period, conflicts become
increasingly less likely to recur.
Explanatory Conditions
As the outcome is dichotomous, all explanatory conditions need
also to be coded dichotomously for crisp set QCA. First, the
primary explanatory condition, which is of interest in this paper, is
the various transitional justice measures which can be implemented
in the post-conflict period. In line with the theoretical arguments
laid out above, we differentiate between three types of transitional
justice.63 First, restorative transitional justice (restorativeTJ) includes
all instances in which truth commissions worked or reparations
were paid. Twenty-three cases of terminated armed conflict have
some form of restorative justice. Second, retributive transitional
justice (retributiveTJ) consists of cases in which trials occurred or
purges of government were conducted. In the dataset, more cases
exhibit retributive justice mechanisms (81 cases) than restorative
justice, representing more than a quarter of all post-conflict
Even if only one actor in a coalition with others is involved in a later conflict,
this is deemed as the conflict reappearing.
63 For more information on the various transitional justice measures’ definition
and operationalization, see, Binningsbø et al., “Armed Conflict and PostConflict Justice.”
62
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scenarios. Third, amnesties (amnesty) constitute the third category
of transitional justice mechanisms that could impact the realization
of a sustainable peace dividend in post-conflict societies. This
mechanism was used in 87 cases included in the dataset.
As discussed above, certain characteristics of the armed
conflict itself could have consequences for the possibility of a
peace dividend, but also for how effective certain transitional
justice mechanisms actually are. The first conflict-related condition
to be included in the model is a dichotomous measure of the
magnitude of battle-related deaths (bigdeath), with 114 post-conflict
peace periods having been preceded by an armed conflict with
more than 1,000 battle-related deaths. Next, the type of conflict
termination could have an effect on whether an enduring peace
dividend emerges or not. We differentiate between an armed
conflict that ended by an outright victory for one side and a
negotiated settlement. The dataset includes 104 cases in which an
armed conflict was terminated through an outright victory, while
nearly two thirds were the result of a bargained solution or some
other form of conflict termination.
Furthermore, societal conditions that could impact the
endurance of peace include the level of democracy and societal
diversity. To gauge the democratic nature of a post-conflict society,
we measure the level of democracy five years after the end of the
conflict according to the Polity IV index (Center for Systemic
Peace 2011).64 Any case was coded as a democracy if the Polity IV
index was between 1 and 10 (inclusive) five years after the
termination of armed conflict and as non-democratic if the value
is between -10 and 0 (inclusive).65 This resulted in 125 cases being
For the precise coding procedure, see Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and
Ted Robert Gurr, Dataset Users’ Manual. Polity IV Project (Vienna, VA: Center for
Systemic Peace, 2011),
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf.
65 Because the Polity IV data is conventionally divided into autocracies,
anocracies and democracies, the dichotomization necessitated by crisp set QCA
forces us to decide whether anocracies are to be classed with democracies or
autocracies. Here, we decide to split the anocracies, counting those with a
positive score as closer to democracy than to autocracy and, thus, in the context
64
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classed as democracies. The condition diversity included in the
dataset is taken from the measure of ethnic fragmentation
developed by Alberto Alesina et al.66 We set the threshold for
highly diverse societies at the average of the dataset, resulting in
152 cases coded as possessing high ethnic diversity.

Condition

Number of cases (%)

Outcome condition: peace
dividend (peacedividend)
Use of restorative transitional
justice mechanisms
(restorativeTJ)
Use of retributive transitional
justice mechanisms
(retributiveTJ)
Use of amnesty (amnesty)
Magnitude of battle-related
deaths (bigdeath)
Termination of conflict through
outright victory (victory)
Democratic state five years after
conflict termination (democracy)
Ethnically diverse and
fragmented society (diversity)

204 (68%)
23 (7.7%)
81 (27%)
87 (29%)
114 (38%)
104 (34.7%)
125 (41.7%)
152 (50.7%)

Table 1: Overview of Absolute and Relative Frequencies of
Included Conditions

of possible post-conflict transitions towards democracy, more in the set of
democracy than out.
66 Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat,
and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8.2 (2003):
155-194.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 96-123

Mariam Salehi and Timothy Williams 117

Results
Given the dichotomous nature of the outcome, it is necessary to
run a crisp set QCA,67 the results of which we present in this
section. The reduction of the truth table using Boolean algebra
results in several configurations of conditions that are sufficient for
causing a peace dividend; one could also term these ‘pathways’ of
conditions that together cause enduring peace. Table 2 lists an
intermediate reduction of the truth table and its eleven constituent
configurations.68 The table also indicates the coverage and
consistency scores for each of these individual pathways, as well as
the overall coverage and consistency of the whole solution.69 The
coverage score of 0.607843 shows that this solution can explain
60.8% of all the cases of enduring peace; that is 124 out of the 204
cases of a peace dividend, leaving only 80 unexplained by these
pathways. Regarding consistency, 87.9% of the cases that have
these combinations of configurations, are in fact also cases with a
peace dividend. This means that only 12.1% are so-called false
Technically, the csQCA was implemented using the software fsQCA in the
version 2.0 and can be found at
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml.
68 Please note that an asterisk * should be read as a ‘logical and‘, meaning that
they connect several conditions within one configuration, which altogether is
sufficient for the peace dividend. Plus + denotes ‘logical or’, that is signifying a
separate configuration. Finally, the symbol ~ signifies the absence of a
condition.
69 Consistency scores indicate how good of a fit a particular combination is; that
is, how many non-occurrences of the outcome (here breakdowns of peace in
the resumption of armed conflict) are also described by this term, thus falsely
predicting an outcome where there is none. Coverage scores show how many
of the outcome cases can be explained by this solution – raw scores detail how
many cases are covered by this combination, while unique coverage means the
cases which are explained only by this combination. To a certain degree, there
is a trade-off between the consistency and coverage scores, as a solution with a
higher consistency (thus explaining only the phenomenon itself and less ‘other
cases’ too) will possibly not be able to explain the same amount of breadth as a
very inclusive solution that explains all cases but also includes some resumptions
of violent conflict. A consistency score of 1, for instance, would indicate that
there are no cases in which the outcome does not occur with these combinations
of conditions, thus making these combinations truly sufficient for causing the
outcome.
67
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positives, cases which we would expect to yield a peace dividend
according to the conditions present in this case, but do not.
Configuration
Raw
of conditions
coverage
amnesty* ~bigdeath 0.186275
amnesty* ~diversity 0.147059
restorativeTJ*
0.034314
~victory* ~amnesty
restorativeTJ*
0.078431
democracy* ~victory
restorativeTJ*
0.058824
democracy* bigdeath
restorativeTJ*
0.053922
democracy * amnesty
retributiveTJ* victory 0.230392
retributiveTJ*
0.073529
democracy*
~diversity
retributiveTJ*
0.049020
democracy*
bigdeath
victory * ~diversity
0.269608
victory * bigdeath
0.147059
solution coverage: 0.607843
solution consistency: 0.879433

Unique
coverage
0.058824
0.019608
0.009804

Consistency

0.000000

0.941176

0.000000

0.923077

0.000000

0.916667

0.029412
0.009804

0.921569
0.750000

0.004902

0.833333

0.058824
0.034314

0.887097
0.882353

0.791667
0.750000
1.000000

Table 2: Results of the csQCA for the Outcome of Enduring
Peace (peacedividend)
The solution states that a peace dividend will occur if an
amnesty is implemented in the absence of a large number of battlerelated deaths or in the absence of an ethnically diverse society.
Furthermore, restorative transitional justice implemented without
amnesty after a negotiated conflict termination can lead to
enduring peace, as can restorative transitional justice in a
democratic setting when combined with either an amnesty, a high
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number of battle-related deaths or, again, the absence of a
unilateral victory. On the other hand, retributive transitional justice
can be successful in providing a peace dividend when a victory
occurs or when it is executed in a democratic society that is
homogenous or has experienced a high number of battle-related
deaths. Finally, peace can ensue after a victorious conflict
termination when society is ethnically homogenous or a large
number of soldiers died in battle. For each of these configurations,
it means that for this specific pathway the presence or absence of
all other conditions is irrelevant for causing a peace dividend.
This solution list of configurations cannot be described as
particularly parsimonious, but it is this complexity that enables it
to integrate the empirical scope in which post-conflict societies can
experience a peace dividend. However, one can distill these results
a little further by looking primarily at those cases with a higher
coverage, those cases which are empirically most important. All
configurations that cover at least 10% of the cases with a peace
dividend are brought together in Table 3.
Peace dividend =
amnesty * (~diversity + ~bigdeath)
+ victory * (~diversity + bigdeath + retributiveTJ)
Table 3: Results of the csQCA for the Outcome peacedividend
with More Than 0.1 Raw Coverage
This slightly reduced composition of the solution
configurations suggests that a peace dividend can be reached by
implementing an amnesty either in the absence of diversity in
society or when mass killing did not occur. Alternatively, peace can
ensue after a victorious conflict termination in the absence of a
diverse society, when many have died in battle or where there has
been retributive transitional justice.
Hence, our findings suggest that strong claims about
transitional justice measures’ impact on peace are not justified. We
find that all three transitional justice conditions, restorative and
retributive justice measures, as well as amnesties, can have positive
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 96-123
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effects. However, each of them affects peace positively after
different conflict situations and in varying context conditions. Our
results also do not give a clear-cut answer to the question of
whether transitional justice really matters for peace. The answer is
also more nuanced. While the implementation of some kind of
transitional justice measure (including amnesties) does play a role
in the majority of pathways to peace, there are also pathways in
which only society and/or conflict characteristics are important
and transitional justice may be simply irrelevant to peace, an option
that Mendeloff70 pointed out with respect to truth commissions
and Lie et al.71 demonstrated in general. Interestingly, our data
suggest that the absence of diversity is a more important societal
factor than the state of democracy. Moreover, certain pathways,
like the combination of a victorious conflict termination with
retributive transitional justice, suggest that it is worthwhile to
further investigate the intention behind the implementation of
post-conflict justice measures as Lie et al.,72 Subotić73 and Loyle
and Davenport74 suggest. Here, since these cases are included in
the dataset, one could speculate that retributive transitional justice
at least partly captures ‘victor’s justice’: trying of the losers by the
victors after a victorious ending of conflict.
Our results go beyond the findings in the article
introducing the dataset, which did not provide results on effects of
justice measures but rather on their likelihood of occurrence in
different settings. Moreover, they hint in a different direction than
those of Loyle and Appel, who also used the PCJ dataset in their
analysis. Most notably, while Loyle and Appel75 did not find
significant positive effects of retributive justice measures (included
in their opportunity-based measures), we assert that they have
positive effects on peace after a clear victorious ending of conflicts.
This difference reveals a need to further investigate the interplay

Mendeloff, “Truth‐Seeking, Truth‐Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding.”
Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace.”
72 Ibid.
73 Subotić, Hijacked Justice.
74 Loyle and Davenport, “Transitional Injustice.”
75 Loyle and Appel, “Justice and/or Peace.”
70
71
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of transitional justice measures with the context conditions, both
considering society and the nature of conflicts and their ending.
Conclusion
In this article, we have put forward the argument that analyses of
transitional justice measures’ impact need to factor in the
complexity of reality, allowing for broad differences across cases,
as well as remain context-sensitive to differences in these cases.
This is particularly necessary as our meta-analysis of the existing
transitional justice literature showed that small-n and large-n
studies based on case studies and statistical analyses, respectively,
come to different conclusions. Case studies showed a tendency
towards attributing negative effects on enduring peace to trials,
while statistical analysis showed either no or positive effects. For
amnesties and truth commissions, the tendency was the opposite,
with case studies signaling positive effects, while statistical analysis
tended more to reach negative conclusions. The literature is much
more differentiated, but this characterization highlights general
tendencies and the obvious problem that this highlights for
research on transitional justice.
We explained these conflicting results for statistical and
case study analyses by their various ways of dealing with
complexity and the different epistemologies on which they are
built. Regarding the latter, statistical studies assume a probabilistic
connection between cause and effect, while case studies are
generally constructed around some form of deterministic
assumptions. As an alternative, we propose using QCA, a method
that better accounts for the complexity of various pathways to the
outcome, as well as remaining sensitive to the context.
For future research, a development of the approach taken
here could also be to undertake a multi-method research project,
combining the generalizable merits of large-n research in
uncovering causal patterns with the eye for the details of the causal
mechanism provided by small-n research. Such a multi-method
research has been most strongly popularized in the social sciences
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by Evan Lieberman’s76 nested analysis. While Lieberman proposes
using statistical analysis at the large-n level, QCA is a promising
alternative here; new research frameworks for combining QCA
with process tracing of individual cases have been presented
particularly by Ingo Rohlfing and Carsten Q. Schneider.77 QCA
provides the causal patterns, the case studies (which are ideally
strategically chosen to leverage explanatory power) can process
trace the causal mechanisms underlying these patterns, both relying
on a deterministic, but complex view of the world.
This process-tracing endeavor after QCA could also allow
for the identification of sequencing of certain transitional justice
measures with regard to characteristics of conflict and society. In
turn, data gathered through qualitative research for specific cases
can be brought together to identify patterns and pathways across
cases by using QCA. Timing and sequencing is not captured by
the QCA analysis we have done here, although as demonstrated in
the work of Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm78 (2015) QCA in
general can be helpful in capturing timing and sequencing. It would
be an additional alternative to let timing and sequencing inform a
multi-method research project (for a framework on combining
QCA and process tracing in multi-method research with special
regard to sequencing).79
Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for
Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review 99.3 (2005):435-452.
77 Ingo Rohlfing and Carsten Q. Schneider, “Improving Research On
Necessary Conditions: Formalized Case Selection for Process Tracing after
QCA,” Political Research Quarterly 66.1 (2013): 220-230; Carsten Q. Schneider
and Ingo Rohlfing, “Combining QCA and Process Tracing in Set-Theoretic
Multi-Method Research,” Sociological Methods & Research 42.4 (2013):559-597;
Carsten Q. Schneider and Ingo Rohlfing, “Case Studies Nested in Fuzzy-Set
QCA on Sufficiency: Formalizing Case Selection and Causal Inference,”
Sociological Methods & Research (2014, in publication); Ingo Rohlfing and Peter
Starke, “Building on Solid Ground: Robust Case Selection in Multi-Method
Research,” Swiss Political Science Review 19.4 (2013): 492–512. See also Timothy
Williams and Sergio Gemperle, “Sequence will tell! Integrating temporality into
set-theoretic multi-method research combining comparative process tracing
and qualitative comparative analysis,” International Journal of Social Research
Methodology (2016).
78 Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “Timing, Sequencing, and Transitional Justice
Impact.”
79 Williams and Gemperle, “Sequence will tell!”
76
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Finally, we demonstrated the explanatory power of using
QCA with pre-existing transitional justice datasets, the Post
Conflict Justice dataset specifically, to study how transitional
justice measures can impact the possibility of a peace dividend. The
set-theoretic results derived from QCA highlight general causal
patterns of sufficient conditions across many cases. Here, again,
we would like to refer back to Sriram’s80 assessment that a ‘peace
vs. justice’ argument may be oversimplified. As it is often done in
the literature, our analysis confirms that it is worthwhile to assess
the impact of transitional justice measures in relation to context
conditions and specificities of conflicts and societies. Rather than
assuming that a certain (set of) transitional justice measure(s) alone
can foster or hinder peace in any kind of situation, our findings
confirm the assumption that different measures may be more or
less suitable for different situations and environments.
Altogether, this paper puts forward an argument for
methodologically diversifying research on transitional justice,
augmenting it to include set-theoretic analysis to complement
more systematically the expert case knowledge already available in
a wide range of publications. This paper does not argue that
statistical analyses or case studies are in and of themselves not
valuable for the furtherance of a transitional justice research
agenda. Instead, these research results are partially incomparable
and incompatible and could and should be complemented by settheoretic analyses to further our knowledge of the complex ways
in which transitional justice mechanism can work. Hence, for the
growing study of transitional justice to become more coherent and
for plausible policy implications to be deduced, it would be helpful
for large-n and small-n studies to be combined and the framework
for multi-method research suggested here to be attempted on a
range of transitional justice questions.
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